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Abstract
Bosnia and Herzegovina possesses both a history marked by ethnic
differences and a tradition of tolerance and coexistence among religious
groups. The millet system of Ottoman times depended upon the authority
of confessional communities. With the rise of nationalism in the 1800’s,
religious identity and organization became complicated by ethnicity. Later,
the authoritarianism of Tito enabled the state to accommodate this multinational, multi-religious character, uniting people as socialist Yugoslavs. Thus,
the collapse of the socialist, Yugoslavian ideals and structures created new
and sometimes polarizing choices for the population. Previously authoritarian
government mediated religious and ethnic relations, but now coexistence
depended upon elected leaders and a democratic polity.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has struggled (indeed fought) through
the first two decades of its independence. This research contends, however,
that tolerance and cosmopolitanism can reemerge. The paper focuses upon
the perception of voters of the Social Democratic Party as an example of a
secular, new left party, and an alternative to parties which operate based
upon ethnoreligious identities. The research uses the European Value Study to
examine popular views of political parties, and assess the issues and interests
of their members, concluding that changing demographics might dictate a
further move from ethnoreligious affiliations and toward secular parties.
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1 Šta je važno biračima
Socijaldemokratske partije u
Bosni i Hercegovini? Liberalno
opredjeljenje i ekonomski
interesi ispred etnoreligijskog
identiteta
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Introduction
Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) possesses a deep tradition of
tolerance and coexistence among religious groups, but also a history
marked by ethnic differences. The millet system of Ottoman times fostered
the authority of religious leaders. With the rise of nationalism in the 1800’s,
ethnic identity both complicated and reinforced religious affiliation and
organization. World War II witnessed horrific inter-ethnic violence in the
region. Later, the authoritarianism of Tito enabled the state to accommodate
the multi-national, multi-religious character, fundamentally uniting people
as socialists within the Yugoslavian Federation. Thus, the collapse of the
socialist, federal, Yugoslav system offered new, and sometimes polarizing,
choices to the population. As notions of freedom and self- determination
swept from Eastern Europe into Bosnia and Herzegovina, alternative
organizing concepts of liberalism and nationalism confronted the people.
In the past, imperial and authoritarian governments mediated religious
and ethnic relations, but now tolerance and coexistence depended upon
democratic leaders and polities.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has struggled (and even fought)
through the first two decades of its independence. Many reasons exist
for pessimism regarding B&H’s future. The current power sharing system
fails to promote cooperation or good governance so that tensions persist
among ethnoreligious groups and between elites and citizens. This paper
contends, however, that B&H’s historic tolerance and cosmopolitanism
can reemerge and bolster democratization and good governance. First,
the people accept liberal democracy as a precondition to European Union
(EU) accession and the economic benefits of membership. Second, group
differentiated rights, a practice consistent both with the traditional millet
system and B&H’s current system of power sharing, offers a method to adapt
liberal democracy to multi-ethnic, multi-religious societies. Finally, this
research suggests the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(SDP) serves as a current example of a political party which attracts some
voters because they associate with its secular and liberal character.
Granted, elitism and factional differences sometimes characterize
the SDP’s leadership. Certainly, Željko Komšić election and re-election
to the Croatian seat of the tri-partite presidency is controversial. Komšić
rejects ethno-religious classification and claims to identify as a Bosnian,
that is, a citizen of B&H without reference to religion or ethnicity. Yet, some
voters and leaders challenge Komšić’s credibility, disputing his legitimate
representation of the Croatian people (Sarajlić, 2012). In fact, they assert
his election highlights an inequity and deficiency in the current system to
the extent that the Croats, as a constituent people, lack a representative in
the presidency due to Bosniac cross-over voting for Komšić (Parish 2011;
Sahadžić 2009). This concern seems warranted given that only 12% of
Croats feel represented by a party, compared to 42% of Serbs and 31% of
Bosniacs (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2012).
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Other analysts conclude, however, that many of Komšić’s
supporters are non-nationalists; this view contends his electoral support
relates to his ability to appeal to the disenchanted electorate, form a
multi-ethnic, supra-national coalition, and mobilize independent voters
(Alic, 2010; The Economist, 2010; National Democratic Institute, 2010). They
emphasize Komšić’s ability to win 60% of the vote, far ahead of the second
place challenger who finished with 19% of the vote. They also point to the
strong showing of the SDP in parliamentary elections.
This analysis employs results from the European Values Study to
compare SDP supporters across a number of variables with supporters
of other parties. The fundamental question is whether the SDP attracts a
distinctive typae of voter, perhaps a supra-nationalist or multicultural voter,
rather than an ethnoreligious voter. Note the purpose is not to argue
whether Komšić is a legitimate presidential representative of the Croatian
constituency, or that the SDP leadership is more responsive or accountable
than other parties.
Rather, this paper focuses upon the Social Democratic Party as a
potential practical alternative to ethnoreligious parties, and an alternative
which some citizens seek. The research examines the character and interests
of the party’s members, and concludes the SDP offers appealing platforms
to voters often neglected in identity politics. In fact voters from various
cultural backgrounds set aside religious considerations for the political,
economic, and post-materialist policies of the SDP. Additionally, analysis
suggests that demographics in B&H indicate a possible future movement
away from ethnoreligious affiliations with generational change. To the
extent such developments lead to the de-emphasis of political religions
and romantic nationalisms, an opening might evolve for B&H to embrace
the cooperation necessary for political and economic progress.

1. Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics
The fact the origins, character, and durability of religious and ethnic
identity in B&H is contested complicates discussion of the nature of politics
and parties. Authors such as Greble (2011) and Donia and Fine (1994) carefully
describe the organizational authority of early religious communities of the
region, noting the general weakness of ethnic identities until the surge of
nationalism beginning in the late 1800s and peaking during WWII. Judt (2005)
contends Yugoslavia returned to its traditional cosmopolitanism in the postwar era. Andjelic (2003) argues that in 1990, B&H still lacked the type of ethnic
movements associated with the modern theories of nationalism. Donia and
Fine estimate 30% - 40% of the marriages in 1990 in B&H were between
individuals of different religious groups (1994: 9). Henkel (2009) shows 29% of
the population considered itself atheist or nonreligious in 1987. Thus, while
B&H possessed a multi-ethnic, multi-religious character, the political salience
of these qualities was limited.
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Moreover, beginning within the environment of self-managed
socialism of the late 1970’s, various cross-cultural groups developed
which emphasized shared interests of citizens in industry, health care,
and tourism (Bartlett, 1985; Uvalić, 1988). Later in the 1980`s, broad based
environmental, economic, religious, and academic associations organized
to voice their particular concerns (Kabala, 1988; Ramet, 1992). Finally in
the 1990’s, social mass uprisings and movements followed the trend
throughout the dissolving Soviet bloc, and sought democratization. Civic
municipal movements invigorated a bottom-up consciousness consistent
with democratic transition based upon a consensus against dictatorship
rooted in ‘insight’ and imagination (Wydra, 2007). Their outreach built on
cosmopolitan civic traditions. The Committee for the Protection of Rights
and Liberties of Individuals and Groups and the Green Movement included
citizens irrespective of ethnic identity (Andjelic, 2003). The movements
attracted a wide range of B&H individuals: Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim,
Jewish and others.
Yet, xenophobic, exclusive nationalisms also emerged in
response to the system’s collapse and reacted against these movements
(Crnobrnja, 1996). According to former President of Yugoslavia Dizdarevic
some communist leaders adopted ethnoreligious identities to counter
democratization (Tesan, 2007). Authoritarian elites then manipulated
ethnic and religious histories and tensions to protect their status (Belloni
and Deane, 2005; Crocker, 2007; Fischer, 2006; Enyedi, 2005). Consequently,
nationalist parties contested the 1990 elections, and 75% of the vote
supported their candidates. In late 1991 the Serbian Democratic Party
(SDS) declared the Serbian Republic of B&H to be followed by the Croatian
Democratic Union’s (HDZ) declaration of a separate Croatian Community.
Finally, the war emphasized the critical nature of religious and ethnic
identities.
Debate continues about the specific origin and character of the
war in B&H. Puhovski identifies this phenomenon of the ‘war after the war…
the battle for the interpretation of the past-as a verbal extension of the warthe key moment for postwar self-understanding of communities…’ (Novi
list, 29 May 2004).2 Stokes, Lampe, Rusinow and Mostow (1996) extensively
review the debate. Woodward (1995) highlights the complex nature of
the dissolution including the influence of economic and international
forces. Torsten (2008) examines the changing nature of the conflict as it
proceeded. Other authors focus upon whether the conflict fits the category
of war of secession or independence (Krech, 1997; Malcolm, 1996; Sudetic,
1998). Hoare identifies secession as a consequence of dissolution but also
describes ‘…Serbia’s assault on Bosnia-Herzegovina [as] the next stage in
Belgrade’s plan of expansionism’ (2010: 123). Indeed, other analyses focus
on an interstate war, emphasizing the aggression of one party (Dizdarevic,
2006; Lampe, 2000; Crnobrnja, 1996). Bennett (1995) specifically highlights

2 www.ex-upress.com/novi/
novilist29.htlm.
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the behavior of Milosevic. By contrast, other accounts maintain a civil war
between ethnic groups occurred (Bose 2002, 2007; Burg and Shoup, 1999).
Facts associated with the B&H conflict establish that the war
followed independence wars in Slovenia and Croatia. The Yugoslav Army
transferred quantities of arms and equipment to B&H from Slovenia and
Croatia prior to the outbreak of fighting. War began in April 1992, lasted
to autumn of 1995, and became characterized as the most catastrophic
and painful conflict in Europe since the Second World War (Bieber, 2010;
Crnobrnja, 1996). As Puhovski (2004) concludes, the conflict possibly
included elements and periods of aggression and civil war. Furthermore,
the conflict continued as elites tried to benefit from their political offices,
and all sides maneuvered to defend their truths.
B&H now struggles with questions of identity and sovereignty,
and current efforts from below to reinvigorate cosmopolitanism (Kaldor,
2006). Many authors assert the war destroyed the historic strength of civic
identities (Belloni, 2004; Crocker, 2007; Mujkić and Husley, 2010; Sahadzić
2009). Of contending significance is that more than half the population
desires to move beyond the memories of the war, and the overwhelming
percentage of the population expresses a willingness to embrace an
identity as a citizen of B&H (UNDP, 2009).
Beyond the ideational impediments of ethnic and religious identity,
however, stand the structural impediments of the current constitution.
As a consociational system the structure tends to privilege elected elites,
emphasize the absence of shared loyalties, and segment the population
into its relevant identities (Horowitz, 1993; Snyder, 2000). Tsebelis’ work
(1990) with nested games and veto players explains consociational
systems as impediments to institutional reform because they reward elites
who engage in conflictual behavior. Elites avoid compromise because
they believe their counterparts under pressure will concede, thus giving
the intransigent elite the best outcome (Ibid). This explanation seems
consistent with Fischer’s notion of B&H politicians as conflict entrepreneurs
who perpetuate the system because of the benefits associated with
patronage (2006). Indeed, Norris (2008) identifies B&H as a case in which
power-sharing arrangements intensify ethnic extremism and threaten
democratization. The consociational structure with its tri-partite presidency,
ethnic vetoes, and powerful entity governments institutionalizes ethnicity
and often impedes state-building, decision-making, economic rationality,
and reconciliation (Tsebelis, 1995; Bose, 2002; Norris, 2008). Elected elites
lack incentives to change the structure which gives them political power.
In fact, some leaders tend to stir and manipulate ethnic feelings in order
to maintain their constituencies (Belloni and Deane, 2005; Crocker, 2007;
Norris, 2008; Tsebelis, 1990). Even voters who prefer a more cooperative
and effective government, might lack sufficient trust in the system to cast a
ballot for non-nationalist candidates (Mujkić and Hulsey, 2010).
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Thus the Dayton Peace Accords reinforce the construction of ethnic
identities and the validity of political parties based upon separate, unique
Croatian, Serbian and Bosniac identities. The currently dominant Serbian
party, Milorad Dodik’s Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) consistently
pursues a secessionist strategy. The disillusionment of the major Croatian
party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), regarding Komšić‘s presidential
election led it to join the SNSD in demanding a new constitutional
arrangement with heightened ethnic autonomy. Indeed, the HDZ and the
SNSD are ethno-nationalist parties which favor decentralization, cultural
autonomy, and potential secession. The HDZ formally affiliates as a Christian
Democratic party, and holds religious and ethnic positions consistent with
the right wing. The SNSD avowedly shares with the SDP a commitment
to socialist democracy, however, currently the SNSD’s membership in the
Socialist International is suspended due to the party’s extreme nationalist
tendencies.
The Bosniac Party of Democratic Action (SDA) prefers to focus on
the economic issues of its constituents, presenting a detailed economic
platform with goals for GDP, employment, balance of trade and budgets
(Avdić and Međedović, 2006). In this sense the SDA potentially shares an
objective of the SDP, that is, to address salient economic challenges, yet
while the SDP explicitly appeals for a multi-ethnic approach, the SDA tends
to accept but deemphasize ethnic considerations. The, SDA highlights its
economic policy, but maintains its Bosniak ethnic identity coupled with a
claim of openness to cultural autonomy.
It is important to note that, despite their electoral success, these
major nationalist parties and the governments they form do not serve
as reservoirs of social capital or trust. Rather, people perceive parties as
invested in corruption and patron-client systems (Divjak and Pugh, 2008:
375-378). Transparency International’s 2010/11 Global Corruption Barometer
shows that the public rates parties as the most corrupt institutions in the
country (with a 4.1/5 where 5 is extremely corrupt). Furthermore, 59% of
the public views corruption as worsening, and 70% believe government
efforts to counter corruption are ineffective. Accordingly, many analysts
contend that political party leaders win re-election, not based upon
effective policies, but through the manipulation of nationalist politics
(Belloni and Deane, 2005; Crocker, 2007; Divjak and Pugh, 2008). Mujkić
and Hulsey (2010) assert that rational voters continue to re-elect failed
nationalist politicians, despite their acknowledged disappointment in and
distrust of these officials, because voters are trapped in a classic prisoners’
dilemma. The majority of the electorate from all ethnic backgrounds
believes the current extreme nationalism of leaders does not serve people
well (National Democratic Institute, 2010; UNDP, 2009). Mujkić and Hulsey
(Ibid) explain if all citizens voted for ethnic moderates or non-nationalists
then B&H’s political stalemate could dissolve. The dilemma for the electorate
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is that if one ethnic group elects a moderate, while another group elects
an extremist, then the moderate voters become worse off because the
extremists will not compromise (Ibid: 144-145). The typical rational voter
caught in the prisoner’s dilemma casts a vote for a nationalist politician.
While such analyses provide a convincing rationale for aspects of
the current situation, the research also recognizes that a non-nationalist
outcome is preferred. Mujkić and Hulsey suggest that in an atmosphere
of trust, rational voters might elect moderates (Ibid: 151-153). A variety of
opinion polls which highlights public disdain for government and political
parties supports this view. These polls reveal the popular preference is for
the leadership to shift its focus from ethnic politics to economic issues
(National Democratic Institute, 2010; UNDP, 2009).
Additionally, research on politics and religion highlights that secular
voters typically prefer secular parties to religious parties, and perceive
religious parties (as compared to other secular parties) as their primary
opposition (Breznau et al., 2011). Research also suggests that the decision
to vote for a religious party often is prompted by perceived corruption
among secular elites. Yet, in the case of B&H, in which the leaders of parties
identified with religion perpetuate corruption, it seems voters might turn to
their secular competition. Indeed, Kurzman and Naqui’s 2010 comparative
analysis shows that most Muslim voters participating in free, democratic
elections are not attracted to religious parties. Therefore, electoral space for
the SDP as a non-religious party to operate seems to exist. At least some
of the public appears sufficiently dismayed with the current intransigent
character of politics that they might look beyond identity politics and direct
their political involvement based upon practical concerns.

2. The Social Democratic Party: New Left
The Social Democrats explicitly oppose the demands of the
nationalist parties and continue to press for a multi-ethnic B&H with a
strong central state. The SDP primarily operates in the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (FB&H) where Serbs only constitute approximately 2%
of the population, but does hold some seats in the Republika Srpska (RS)
where Bosniacs, Croats and Others probably also constitute less than 2%
of the population. The SDP’s platform and policies emphasize a multiethnic B&H. The party website calls for solidarity and targets workers and ‘all
those in need’. The organization strives to attract followers with appeals to
counter corruption, and provide accountability and transparency. A critical
aspect of its character is its strong identification with Europe – it believes
membership in Europe will facilitate economic and political democracy.
The SDP also distinguishes itself from its competitors because it favors
constitutional changes to guarantee the rights of citizens irrespective of
ethnicity. While parties sometimes deviate from avowed platforms, the
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SDP’s emphasis on democracy, development and inclusiveness provides
citizens with an alternative to identity politics.
After disappointing election results in 2002, the SDP refused to
compromise with nationalist parties and instead sought to reemphasize
its focus on the economy, education, and social reconstruction based
upon B&H’s multi-ethnic tolerance. The SDP now differentiates itself from
the Bosniac SDA on two substantive grounds. First, the SDP embraces
strength from diversity and argues for tolerance, while the SDA asserts a
desire to set aside the national question by providing cultural autonomy
to all groups. Second, the SDP favors centralization of state activity, while
the SDA prefers decentralization. In this regard, the SDP distinguishes itself
from ethnoreligious parties because it favors ending the ethnic preferences
which exist within the current constitutional system.
The SDP is a member of the Socialist International and holds
associate membership with the EU’s European Socialists. Indeed, the SDP
presents a clear economic platform which seems consistent with its social
democratic affiliations. The SDP links its identity to its origin in the fight
against fascism and on behalf of workers in the early 1900s. Typical of
contemporary European social democrats, the SDP accepts the advantages
of capitalism and right to private property, but balances these principles
with a commitment to solidarity and an extended welfare state. The party
emphasizes the need for government policies which provide all citizens with
rights to education, health care and employment. It currently highlights
its commitment to protect the interests of all progressive groups as B&H
moves out of recession and toward EU accession. It specifically promotes
social assistance for individuals in need, particularly citizens disabled and
displaced in the war.
Finally, the SDP seems to seek to enlarge its appeal through
spanning its traditional emphasis on rights to education and health care,
to a contemporary leftist appeal to inclusion of all groups. Thus, the SDP
integrates elements of historic social democracy, in its planks for economic
justice, with post-modern claims for individual liberty and quality of life
issues. The SDP advocates the equality of all individuals and stands as an
explicitly anti-nationalist party.
Indeed, analysis of the 2008 European Values Study results for Bosnia
and Herzegovina indicates that the SDP is the only major party with a multiethnic base. Examination of the variables on party preference by religions
suggests an entirely Muslim following supports the Party for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (SB&H) and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA). Likewise,
the Croatian Democratic Union and the Alliance of Independent Social
Democrats are exclusively Roman Catholic and Orthodox, respectively. By
contrast, the supporters (that is the population which claims it would vote
for the party) of the SDP are 67% Muslim, 27% Catholic, and 5% Orthodox.
Given that the SDP primarily operates in the Federation and not the
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Republika Srpska, the ethnic diversity of support mirrors well the diversity
of the population. Although no official post-war census has occurred, the
UNHCR’s 1996 census estimates an approximate breakdown of 46% Bosniac,
37% Serb, and 15% Croat. Within the FB&H estimates are 73% Bosniac, 22%
Croat, 2% Serb and 2% other. When individuals in the European Values Study
are asked which party appeals to you most, 100% of HDZ supporters are
Croats, 100% of SNSD supports are Orthodox, and 100% of SDA supporters
are Muslim. By contrast, 70% of the SDP base is Muslim, 18% is Catholic
and 12% is Orthodox. Thus, the SDP attracts wide support relative to (and
consistent with) the demographics of the FB&H.
With regard to other demographic variables, the SDP appears in
some instances to resemble the HDZ and SNSD, but clearly is markedly
different than the SDA; that is, the SDP and SDA seem to appeal to different
Muslim constituencies. Most notable is the breakdown of age of supporters
for the SDP and SDA. Older Muslims seem far more inclined to support the
SDA. Only 13% of SDP voters are older than 46, while 41% of SDA voters are
older than 46. Conversely, only 32% of SDA supporters are under the age
of 30, while 63% of SDP voters are under the age of 30 (Table 1). Possibly
older voters feel and remember the ethnic cleansing during the war, while
young voters 18-30 are less inclined to be influenced by a war which began
20 years ago. If an accurate interpretation, then SDP supporters possibly
vote in a rational, long term prospective time frame different than the SDA’s
retrospective time frame. This also might suggest that as generational
change proceeds, parties like the SDP might draw increasing strength.
Table 1. Age Distribution of Supporters (Percentage)

18-30
31-46
47-62
> 62

SDP
63.33
23.33
6.67
6.67

SDA
31.82
27.77
36.36
4.55

HDZ
66.67
22.22
5.56
5.56

SNSD
57.14
25.71
17.14
0.00

Source: European Values Study, B&H
Additionally, and partially as an effect of the age distribution of
supporters, the SDP’s voters tend to be better educated than the SDA’s
electorate, and more comparable to the voters of the HDZ and SNSD.
Eighty percent of SDP voters have high school or university educations,
while only 56% of SDA’s voters possess such a background (Table 2). The
SDP’s positioning as a party of tolerance, focused upon a future in Europe,
might attract better educated, younger voters who perceive their economic
status, civil liberties and political freedom best secured through the EU.
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Table 2. Educational Level of Supporters (Percentage)

Primary (or none)
Secondary
University

SDP
20.00
62.00
18.00

SDA
43.50
55.29
1.18

HDZ
18.80
62.32
18.84

SNSD
19.88
68.29
12.80

Source: Ibid
Analysis of other variables by party within the European Values
Study suggests the SDP tends to attract a base with a higher annual income
than the SDA or SNSD attracts. The HDZ’s supporters have the highest
income, but this probably relates to a generally more developed economy
in Herzegovina from which it draws its electorate. Most noticeable is that
69% of SDA supporters have annual incomes below 3.600 euros, while
only 32% of SDP supporters possess incomes at this low level. Forty-eight
percent of SDP voters are employed, while only 30% of SDA voters hold jobs.
Moreover, the appeal of the SDP starkly contrasts with the SDA in higher
income categories where the SDA draws negligible support. The SDP splits
the base of the wealthiest segment of the population, earners above 18.000
euros annually, with the HDZ. These statistics suggest the broad nature of
the SDP’s socio-economic attraction. The party’s appeals for solidarity and
commitment to individuals with great need coupled with its focus on the
economy and membership in Europe enable it to attract supporters from
across the socio-economic spectrum. Additionally, the SDP’s ability to gain
votes from Muslims and Catholics who wish to move beyond ethnic politics
probably explains the party’s appeal to individuals with a broader range of
income given that Catholics tend to be the highest earning and Muslims
the lowest earning segments of the population.

3. A Deeper Examination of the SDP’s Appeal
Given that the SDP appeals to diverse economic and ethnic
groups in B&H, the challenge then is to identify why the party attracts
such support. The first avenue of explanation is that SDP supporters are
more tolerant of diversity and/or less religious, and therefore more likely
to favor a secular party than are supporters of other B&H parties. Indeed,
as a proxy measure, responses to questions on the European Values Study
show 39% of SDP voters claim inter-religious marriage is not a problem.
This contrasts with 14% of SDA voters, 16% of HDZ voters and 30% of
SNSD voters. Additionally, SDP voters are far less likely than other voters
to believe religion should influence politicians. Approximately 21% of the
SDP’s electorate concurs, while 51% disagrees. In marked contrast, 56% of
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the SDA’s electorate believes religion should matter for politicians, and only
19% disagrees. Thus, it seems more secular Muslims would be more inclined
to support the SDP than the SDA. Consistent with this is the fact that 54%
of SDA supporters report regularly attending religious services while only
13% of SDP supporters regularly attend. Finally, 55% of HDZ supporters
view religious beliefs as important for politicians while 28% disagree,
and 75% report regular service attendance. Again, it might be the case
that more tolerant and/or secular Croats tend to consider supporting the
SDP (Table 3). Indeed, SDP voters comprise 57% of all voters who disagree
with the notion that religion should influence politicians. The comparable
percentage for the SDA is 12%, and for the HDZ is 20%. Likewise, SDP’s
electorate constitutes only 12% of the total electorate that agrees that
politicians should permit religion and beliefs to influence decision-making.
Table 3. Religiosity and Parties’ Electorate (Percentage)

Politicians rely upon God
Agree Strongly
Agree
Neither
Disagree
Disagree Strongly

SDP
3.06
18.37
27.55
32.65
18.37

SDA
10.84
45.78
24.10
18.07
1.20

HDZ
10.14
43.48
17.39
21.74
7.25

SNSD
18.13
23.75
27.50
22.50
8.13

Source: Ibid
Percentages for the SDA, HDZ and SNSD are 28%, 22%, and 32%
respectively, with the remainder supporting smaller B&H parties. These
results indicate that SDP supporters perhaps are attracted to the party
because of its explicitly non-denominational and secular character.
In this regard, it is important to note that Muslims in B&H seem to
be less precise about their Muslim identity than Muslims in other states.
Perhaps this suggests a relative de-emphasis of the identity and/or lower
level of religiosity which might dampen the compulsion to vote for a party
identified with religion, particularly the further in time B&H moves from
the defining events of 1992-1995. A majority of Muslims in B&H identify as
‘just Muslim’ with the remainder identifying as Sunni. This is comparable
to the response in Kosova and Albania, but differentiates the population
from Muslims in other countries, particularly in the Middle East, South Asia,
and Sub-Saharan Africa (Pew, 2012: 128). Likewise only 30% of B&H Muslims
attend the mosque at least weekly, while more than 60% attend seldom
or never. This compares to weekly attendance rates of about 60-80%
throughout the Middle East, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In these
regions, the non-attendance rate tends to range from 30%-45% (Ibid: 130).
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In fact, only 36% of B&H Muslims agree that their religion is important
to them. Of 39 Muslim populations surveyed, only three countries have a
lower percentage agreeing their religion is important: Albania, Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan (Ibid: 8). This weaker affiliation with Islam as well as the high
level of infrequent mosque attendance, then potentially suggests a lower
likelihood that they will vote only Muslim. An important consideration
is that Muslims who rarely attend mosque are unlikely to hear politics
interpreted from an Islamic perspective; nor will they benefit from the
shared consciousness of the frequent attendees. The organizational basis
often associated with membership in religiously affiliated parties therefore
is absent (Olson, 2011).
Another source of attraction of the SDP for Bosniac and Croatian
voters seems to be its identity as a contemporary party of the New Left.
Twenty percent of voters who self-classify as left contend they will vote
for the SDP, while only 12% intend to vote for the SDA and 2% plan to
vote for the HDZ. The SNSD also attracts 20% of the left vote, but it is less
apparent that the SDP competes for voters with the SNSD particularly in
the RS. Furthermore, a much smaller percentage of the SDP’s membership
classifies itself as ideologically right when compared to the memberships
of the SDA, HDZ and SNSD. The results of the European Value Study shows
only 25% of the SDP considers itself as right wing while approximately 46%
of the SDA, 74% of the HDZ and 50% of the SNSD claim to be right wing
(Table 4). The data suggests that the HDZ is considered a right wing party
based upon its nationalist identity. The SNSD is less clearly right wing; while
it formally claims to be socialist, its nationalist politics pulls it to the right
in a one-dimensional ideological spectrum. Perhaps the SDA’s identity is
most interesting given the claim of the HDZ leadership that the SDP simply
serves as another vehicle for Bosniac voters. Not only is the SDP’s Muslim
and Croatian electorate noticeably more secular than the SDA’s supporters,
but the SDA members tend to perceive themselves on the center-right
while the SDP supports tend to shift toward the center- left.
Table 4. Ideological Identification among Party Electorates

Party
SDP
SDA
HDZ
SNSD
Source: Ibid

Left
32.89%
23.08%
5.66%
17.86%

Center
42.11%
30.77%
20.75%
32.14%

Right
25.00%
46.15%
73.58%
50.00%
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Yet, the identification of the SDP as center-left compared to other
B&H parties exists with some ambiguity. When B&H party supporters are
asked to respond to specific policies associated with a left-right spectrum
in the country, the distinctiveness of the SDP as the party of the left is
lost. For example, in response to a question whether industry should be
government owned or privately owned (scaled with 10 as government and
1 as private ownership) the mean responses for party supporters were: SDP
6.3, SNSD 7.2, SDA 6.7, SBiH 5.3 and HDZ 5.2. When people are asked whether
meeting economic and social needs falls primarily to the state (10) or
individuals (1), responses ranged among the various parties from 6 to 7 with
SDP members averaging 6.47. When party supporters were asked whether
emphasis should exist on equal incomes (10) or individual incentives (1),
the SDP, SDA and HDZ all had means of approximately 5. Such results
suggest two tentative conclusions: first that society still is transitioning in a
post-communist era, and the population is caught between capitalist and
socialist paradigms, and second, the characterization of the SDA and HDZ
as center-right compared to the center-left SDP might rely heavily upon
the supporters’ association of nationalist and religious appeals with the
right wing. When the SDA and HDZ are considered solely on an economic
spectrum, these parties’ appeals appear comparable to that of the SDP.
Consequently, the perception of the SDP as center-left could arise
precisely because it has disassociated from any ethnoreligious appeal. The
SDP won 5 of 42 parliamentary seats in 2006 and 7 of 42 seats in 2010.
Additionally, Komšić as the SDP presidential candidate won the Croatian
seat in both elections. Although the party suffers from factionalism and
elitism common in B&H, it seems to attract a base which is less defined
by ethnoreligious identity than the base of the other dominant parties.
The SDP probably does attract “new left” voters who emphasize issues of
accountability, governability and quality of life rather than nationality. Such
citizens risk supporting a non-nationalist party which favors structural
changes to decrease the influence of ethnicity in government and eliminate
the counterproductive incentives of power sharing.

Conclusions
The deadlock which surrounded B&H politics since the 2010
elections began to thaw in late 2011. The anticipated independence for
Republika Srpska and possibly Herzegovina failed to materialize. At the end
of the year, a new government formed with six major parties cooperating
to share power in order to position B&H for EU and IMF assistance. Yet,
uncompromising, ethnoreligious politics based on exclusive identities
continues to loom as a potential quagmire for B&H. The SDP stands as an
alternative for rational voters frustrated with the prisoner’s dilemma of
ethnoreligious politics.
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Indeed, B&H’s history suggests the possibility of alternative
cultural traditions beyond the current polarization and segmentation of
ethnoreligious groups. Howard discusses civic cooperation and contends
that ‘organized groups committing violence…hardened ethnic identities’
(2012: 167). Olson (2011) examines the important cultural effect of religion
on politics, and the tendency to dichotomize identities, but also mentions
the potential for shared values among religious traditions. Greble (2011)
details the long history of multiculturalism. Thus, the SDP might serve as a
vehicle to begin to reclaim B&H’s multi-religious, tolerant culture.
Moreover, the effect of communism on culture should be
considered. As noted, the SDP, as well as all B&H’s current major parties,
tends to favor a mixed economy with a safety net. The B&H citizen operates
within a post-communist context. Inglehart and Welzel demonstrate
that post-communist polities tend to be less religious than comparable
societies outside the former communist experience. Breznau et al. (2011)
also suggest that voters in post-Communist systems are more likely to
support non-religious parties than voters in other states. While the conflict
in B&H creates unique complications, the SDP offers a choice for citizens
frustrated with ethnoreligious politics. The party positions itself as a party of
the center-left, and it could expand its membership as generational change
occurs and younger secular and less religious voters increase in proportion.
The option is one which emphasizes the relevance of the new center-left in
transitioning states for citizens who seek inclusion, accountability, a social
safety net, and individual rights (Cronin et al., 2011: 3). In B&H, society still
must negotiate the precise type of balance between capitalism and socialist
democracy which elsewhere in Europe already exists and evolves, but the
SDP alone emphasizes the salience of such issues beyond the question of
ethnicity.
The SDP represents both the left of the 1900`s with representation
from workers and veterans, but also the intellectual, post-material quality
of life and libertarian left of the new century. The party’s commitment to
structural and constitutional changes to support high quality democracy
separates it from the ethnoreligious parties which favor the current
consociational system. Howard suggests that structures must change in
B&H for the political system to break from ‘the ethnocracy trap’ (2012: 155).
The SDP currently challenges the status quo of power-sharing among elites
and promotes structures for reform. As such, the SDP offers an alternative
to identity politics and an opportunity for individual and national freedom
and progress within B&H.
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